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WHAT IS NECESSARY AND
WHAT IS POSSIBLE IN TODAY’S
ECONOMIC POLICY:





Politik ist die Kunst, das Notwendige möglich 
zu machen.1
(Herbert Wehner, German politician, 1906–1990)
Richard Musgrave argued that government inter-
vention needs justification (Musgrave 1959). In
short, governmental economic activity should be
structured around market failure.Reacting to such
market failures is intervention motivated on effi-
ciency grounds – politics then makes possible what
is necessary. At the same time, it must be recog-
nized that intervention is often subject to the same
limited information that causes market failure.
Moreover, a government managed by officials is
often weak in the sense that actions are biased to
serve short-term political interests. The current
financial crisis is a good example of market failure
and poor government performance. Necessary
regulation of the financial sector, which was intro-
duced to fight imminent market failure in the
early days,became weaker – or,arguably,too weak
– due to governments’ choice to relax the level of
intervention. As is evident by now, governments’
choice to reduce intervention has created the fail-
ure of regulation.In the following,we briefly reca-
pitulate the government failure that caused the
crisis in order to lay the foundation for a better
design of public interventions in the aftermath of
the crisis.
The roots of the crises: a brief overview
Let us distil complicated reality down to compre-
hensible patterns. It is well understood that the
recent financial collapse has been caused by a pol-
icy package designed to encourage banks to give
credits especially to those US individuals whose
income situation is generally not sound enough to
qualify for conventional loans. In other words, the
problems on financial markets we observe today
have their roots in the large scale deregulation of
financial markets that has triggered a substantial
increase in private income and wealth for a politi-
cally relevant number of people for an intermedi-
ate period of time. Deregulation of credit markets
has resulted in increased private consumption and
high inflows of capital and investment goods into
the US economy.
The international repercussions were twofold.
Germany as a major exporting country benefited
from the international market imbalances. At the
same time, German financial institutions suffered
from a decline in the return on equity as a conse-
quence of international competitive pressures in
the banking industry. Accordingly, German banks
prompted the German government for deregula-
tion to increase their profitability and to reduce
the likelihood of takeovers. Similar to other
European countries in a like situation, the govern-
ment pursued short-term national interests. Only
recently has the failure of deregulated credit mar-
kets become public knowledge. The dilemma now
is that a collapse of the financial system provoked
by lax public regulation can only be prevented by
drastic public intervention in financial markets.
Moreover, consumers’ higher exposure to the risk
of credit default has reduced private consumption
in the United States.The result is a drastic decline
of incoming orders for the German export indus-
tries that had profited from the trade imbalances
during the years of the credit boom in the United
* University of Paderborn.
1 Politics is the art of making possible what is necessary.States. Politicians now argue for government res-
cue packages to stabilize these so-called “core”
industries.
Government objectives and incentives 
The above summary of events is surely too brief.
Nevertheless, it clearly demonstrates that any level
of (de)regulation or fiscal policy is obtained as the
outcome of a political process. Major players in this
process are non-benevolent officials who choose
policy instruments as to maximize support. Note
that diverse government instruments are often sub-
stitutable in a second-best setting, albeit at some
economic cost. Thus it is not only the set of avail-
able instruments that determines outcomes but also
incentives. Public economic activity is often fuzzy
and complex because complicated structures may
be designed to serve special interest groups.This, in
turn, creates a problem for policy evaluation, as an
isolated view of a subset of public activity is mean-
ingless.It is clear then that one should not celebrate
the diverse public packages that have recently been
adopted in many countries as the triumph of the
welfare state over the market system, or as the tri-
umph of collective action over anonymous markets.
In politics it is often unimportant how one arrives
at a specific allocation as long as one (at least
roughly) achieves the politically desired outcome.
As an example, the beneficiaries from capital mar-
ket deregulation before the crisis now seem to opt
for more regulation and more government inter-
vention in order to externalize the costs of their
actions. This turns out to be a truly Panglossian
view on the world,as Cohen (2008) argues,as actors
aim at making the best out of today’s situation,
thereby shirking any responsibility for the econo-
my’s problems in the first place.
Turning back to politics,surely there does not exist a
system of imposed order in the Hobbesian sense;the
representative democracies we observe today are
naturally second-best since the Lockesian case for a
government that respects individual freedom is
imperfectly implemented. The political process cre-
ates a prisoners’ dilemma in the sense that the gov-
ernment might prefer to offer deregulation as part of
a policy package serving important particular inter-
ests.Even worse,the resulting consequences for effi-
ciency and distribution are amplified by a second
prisoners’ dilemma resulting from the strategic poli-
cy choice to attract economic activity in internation-
al competition among governments.It seems reason-
able that both dilemmas lead to a failure of govern-
ments in terms of standard welfare economics.
Given these very basic insights, the first question in
the context of the present economic situation is
whether economics is able to identify measures that
are useful in reducing the negative consequences of
the current crisis, given the absence of strong gov-
ernments. The second question is whether the rec-
ommendations can, in fact, be implemented. The
answer to the first question requires a ranking of
measures, the answer to the second question
requires mechanisms designed to ensure that politi-
cians meet their participation constraint.As a matter
of course, the answers to both questions are interde-
pendent, and separate answers are only acceptable
on the grounds of tractability and the convenience of
the reader. The following discussion uses examples
and is not meant to be exhaustive.
A short evaluation of German state guarantees and
economic stimulus packages
In Germany we currently observe huge efforts to
stabilize the banking system. To be sure, it is advis-
able to prevent a collapse of financial markets and
avoid a bank run. Nevertheless, one should bear in
mind what standard economic theory suggests: the
short-sighted agents tend to externalize the costs of
their own actions in a repeated game if they do not
have to face a loss of reputation or some other
penalty. More specifically, bank managers will clear-
ly continue to pursue short-run optimization strate-
gies in the absence of the risk of bank failure or neg-
ative effects on reputation. This is evident in the
broad utilization of public guarantees by the banking
industry that prevents bank failures and,at the same
time, makes any individual bank almost undistin-
guishable from its competitors. The broad use of
guarantees makes individual banks immune to the
risk of reputation loss.
As a matter of course, the recent guarantees pro-
vided to the banking industry may be justified on
the grounds of economic stabilization; the point
here is that a corner solution where no bank fails is
as undesirable as a corner solution where a bank
run occurs. One should additionally note that an
outcome with public guarantees that avoids bank
failures might indicate that public intervention is
designed to secure the market shares of domestic
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banks in international governmental competition.
In fact, attempts to harmonize banking regulation
internationally to create a level playing field seem
to have received substantial political attention in
Germany only at the beginning of the crisis. Given
that other countries have similar incentives, one
should not be overly optimistic with regard to inter-
national harmonization.
Turning to economic stimulus packages, Germany
has seen a substantial increase in government spend-
ing as a consequence of the economic stimulus pack-
ages I and II designed to dampen fluctuations in out-
put and employment.One of the measures contained
in these packages is a subsidy provided in 2009 and
2010 to workers on short-time working, aimed at
avoiding spells of unemployment.Economic research
documented in Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005)
and elsewhere suggests that the welfare costs of
unemployment fluctuations are substantial and high-
ly unevenly distributed across skills, with particular
losses for low-skilled, low-paid and young workers.
Not only because of these welfare costs, but also in
view of the upcoming federal elections,providing this
subsidy appears to be a reasonable choice of eco-
nomic policy instrument from the government’s per-
spective. Fast increasing unemployment rates tend to
be adverse to incumbent government’s electoral out-
comes (Mueller 2003).
More generally, the underlying incentive problem of
politicians with regard to several measures in the
economic stimulus packages may be described as a
divergence of private benefits and social costs.
Politicians and parties gain political support from
public spending which imposes a social – and usual-
ly higher – cost on tax payers. The political benefits
may also explain why the German government,
which usually tends to glorify the export-bias of the
German economy (Germany – in a somewhat mer-
cantilistic manner – prides itself to be the world’s
export champion), suddenly turns to stimulate noto-
riously weak domestic consumption rather than free-
riding on other countries’ efforts to stimulate their
economies.
A similar reasoning applies also to the second mea-
sure that we would like to bring to attention: the
wrecking bonus (Abwrackprämie),a subsidy of 2,500
euros for scrapping and replacing used cars that is
only paid out in 2009.It goes without saying that this
subsidy is designed to increase the demand for cars
in an attempt to stabilize the – highly important –
German automobile industry in times where there is
a dramatic drop in orders from the United States.
This measure is already problematic per se because
of – among other things – its adverse effects on envi-
ronmental protection (gains in fuel efficiency of new
cars are completely offset by the new cars’ greater
weight) and on used-car exporters: in 2006, these
firms earned almost six billion euros in revenues by
exporting more than 500,000 cars (Sinn 2009). The
government’s prioritizing is rather obvious here.
However, the consequences of the subsidy are more
subtle. Consider a consumer who is exposed to the
risk of getting unemployed.The consumer wishes to
smooth his consumption path over time because of a
declining marginal utility of consumption. The sub-
sidy is only paid in 2009, implying that many con-
sumers will revise their consumption plans. Those
consumers stop saving and accumulate debt, espe-
cially in the low-income strata, who demand rela-
tively inexpensive cars because the marginal effect
of the subsidy is highest for those cars. Less savings
mean that less collateral is accumulated.Hence,con-
sumers make riskier decisions, anticipating that debt
cannot be repaid in times of unemployment.To con-
clude,the simple model sketched here has the subtle
effect that the subsidy targeted at the automobile
industry to stabilize industry sales causes low income
types to take up more debt (at least, welfare recipi-
ents are excluded from applying for the wrecking
bonus – however, only after some political struggle).
Furthermore it remains to be seen whether the
scrapping certificates needed to receive the subsidy
cannot be forged. Otherwise used cars will illegally
be sold in other parts of the world.These considera-
tions lead to the question of whether the political
payoff generated by the wrecking bonus justifies its
economic costs.
Finally, in Germany we have seen a dramatic
decrease of incoming orders, especially in the export
sector.This means that credit constraints may in fact
become binding as expected future profits decline.
However, the mere fact that debt financing becomes
more expensive when expected future profits fall
does not constitute a market failure that justifies
public intervention. It has been argued, however,
that present and future economic environments are
characterized by uncertainty resulting in dysfunc-
tional credit markets (Gonzales-Paramo 2008).
While uncertainty could potentially constitute a
market failure and might induce support for govern-
ment intervention, it is also true that the distinctionbetween risk and uncertainty is hardly operational,
since the probability distribution of profits is often 
– at best – private information.The firm will have lit-
tle interest in making its private knowledge about
true economic profits publicly available, as this
would ultimately eliminate potential gains from
strategic behavior.To see this we should understand
that information is asymmetrically distributed
between private agents and the public administra-
tion. Any signal given is thus not verifiable by the
public,making it profitable for private agents to pro-
vide highly diffuse or strongly biased evidence of
their future prospects in an attempt to attract
resources from the public administration. It then
seems obvious that any distinction between risk and
uncertainty that is based on publicly available infor-
mation is very likely strongly biased; this is creating
a risk, namely that the definition of uncertainty is
wide open for political capture.
Summary
The present discussion attempted to evaluate the
benefits and costs of public intervention from the
point of view of welfare economics.We tried to clar-
ify that the political process might lead society to a
different evaluation of public economic activity,with
the risk that government caters to special interest
groups and engages in international competition for
economic activity. It should also have become obvi-
ous from the discussion that it is of primary impor-
tance to harmonize banking regulation provisions at
an international level to guarantee an efficient func-
tioning of financial markets. Public spending pro-
grams such as infrastructure programs are timely
and can easily be ceased. Society that cares about
distribution should stabilize employment with mea-
sures that do not have a large effect on firms’ opera-
tions.Against this background the subsidy for short-
time working is appropriate. Other measures appear
to be less appropriate and rather driven by problem-
atic incentives for specific actors in the political
process – somewhat contrary to the idea that politics
is the art of making possible what is necessary.
A measure that has not been used so far in Germany
is broad-based tax cuts. It is certainly true that tax
cuts might not have a large-scale effect on private
spending; and broad-based tax cuts, almost by defin-
ition, cannot be targeted to help specific sectors. On
the other hand,tax cuts lead to an increase in savings
and investment; and, most importantly, broad-based
tax cuts seem to be less vulnerable to political cap-
ture. However, taxpayers constitute a large and het-
erogeneous group, which may be one of the major
reasons why tax reforms are currently not high on
the political agenda.
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